

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 March 1988

PANAMA: COPING WITH THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Summary

In our judgment, the next few weeks will be the most critical for Panama City as it attempts to restore order in the banking system and meet its essential expenditures. If the regime weathers the immediate crisis, its chances of developing additional sources of revenue and coping with the political tensions that would accompany harsh austerity measures would be significantly improved. If, on the other hand, Panama's dollar-based domestic banking system collapsed, most alternative sources of financing probably would dry up, creating an acute financial crisis. Under such circumstances, we believe Noriega would not hesitate to implement radical economic measures such as nationalizing the banking system, ending the use of the US dollar as Panama's national currency, or even freezing US assets in Panama to avoid relinquishing power. [REDACTED]

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We estimate that the government will require about \$158 million to meet essential expenditures in March and April. If business activity quickly returns to near-normal levels, government reserves and expected receipts should be adequate to cover essential bills. On the other hand, if most banks remain closed and business activity remains restricted, government income could be reduced by half--generating a cash shortfall of as much as \$40 million over the next two months.

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This typescript was prepared by [REDACTED]
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
contributions from the Office of Global Issues. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle
American-Caribbean Division [REDACTED]

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Over the next year, we estimate that the government will need from \$1.67 to \$1.85 billion to meet its financial requirements and that government revenues will total no more than \$1.1 billion. If, as we expect, Panama does not make its \$550 million in scheduled debt payments this year, the shortfall would be reduced to a level approximately equal to that of last year. [redacted]

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Several options would be available to Noriega to address both an immediate budgetary crisis and the regime's longer term financing requirements. Hundreds of millions of dollars could be obtained by imposing harsh austerity measures, tapping the personal accounts of Noriega and other wealthy senior military officers, or cutting deals with Latin American drug traffickers. In addition, the regime might acquire lesser sums from foreign governments or private investors. [redacted]

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The Short-Term Budget Problem

Financial Requirements

We calculate that the regime will need \$158 million to meet essential government expenditures in March and April (See Table 1: Panama: Short-Term Financing Requirements). The most important requirement is for some \$82 million to meet government civilian and military payrolls. The regime's financial crunch will be slightly more severe in April because payroll expenditures will include an additional \$12 million to cover triannual worker bonuses, that equal one third of a month's salary. [redacted]

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The regime also owes foreign commercial creditors \$115 million in interest and principal payments in March and April, but we agree with the assessment of foreign bankers that Panama will not make those payments. Commercial bankers, however, expect Panama to negotiate a formal debt rollover in the near future. Bankers want assurances that interest payments--including \$45 million that comes due in March--will be made as soon as possible. Panama's Bank Advisory Committee is scheduled to meet this week in New York to consider the regime's request for further postponements of \$70 million in debt principal that comes due in April. [redacted]

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Financial Resources

We estimate that the regime will have \$196 million to \$206 million available--including liquid financial reserves at the National Bank of Panama and anticipated government revenues in March and April--to cover its essential expenditures:

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[redacted] The US restraining order temporarily freezing Panamanian assets held in the United States has further complicated the National Bank's liquidity problems.

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- Assuming that business activity returns to near-normal levels, we believe the regime's tax receipts will total \$114 million in March and April.
- Revenues from non-tax receipts--including net balances from public sector enterprises and canal and oil pipeline fees--have recently averaged about \$28 million per month. The decision to escrow canal payments should cost the regime about \$7 million a month. A similar decision on the pipeline would reduce regime receipts by a like amount. If only canal receipts are affected, regime non-tax receipts are likely to total \$42 million during March and April. [redacted]

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If the current banking crisis continues, however, collection problems and depressed economic activity could halve current regime income. This would reduce total funds available to the regime during March and April to \$118-128 million--\$30-40 million less than it needs to cover essential government expenditures.

[redacted]

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Long-Term Budget Problem

Based on US Embassy reporting and our analysis of public sector operations, we project the regime's total financial requirements for 1988 to fall between \$1.67 billion and \$1.85 billion. (See Table 2: Panama: Central Government Operations, 1985-1988). Government revenues during 1988 probably will range between \$0.9 billion and \$1.1 billion, assuming the banking system recovers in the next few weeks and the opposition refrains from sustained strike activities. We fully expect Panama to maintain the principal moratorium on Paris Club and commercial bank debt; thereby foregoing some \$550 million in expenditures. The government, however, is likely to continue paying the higher priority debt service on short-term suppliers' credits and other trade financing. We believe the regime also will try to remain current on interest obligations, which will require nearly \$100 million more than last year, according to Embassy and World Bank figures. [redacted]

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Assuming the regime maintains its debt moratorium, it still must cope with an uncovered public sector deficit of \$250 million--about \$25 million higher than the 1987 gap. Covering

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the financial deficit, however, will be more difficult in 1988 because of the large erosion in the Bank of Panama's financial reserves. Last year, the regime drew down its reserves by \$190 million to cover its deficit. [redacted]

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Alternative Sources of Financing

In addition to the postponement of debt payments, the regime could turn to internal borrowing, spending cuts, and other less traditional strategies and resources to narrow its financial gap.

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[redacted] a number of options are available that would help the regime address both its most immediate economic crisis as well as its broader financing requirements in the coming months. [redacted]

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Government Austerity Efforts

If the economic situation does not improve soon, we believe the regime would consider imposing strong austerity measures. Although Noriega would like to avoid the adverse political impact of such actions, he may calculate that the economic gains would outweigh the political costs. The regime might conclude that it is less risky to attempt drastic, but carefully managed, spending cuts rather than lurch toward potential insolvency that would spark serious domestic turmoil. [redacted]

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One austerity package prepared by Delvalle's cabinet last month probably would net the government some \$200 million if implemented this year. The plan, drafted in part to revive 1988 budget legislation that has been stalled since last December, includes a variety of measures to cut the public payroll, increase taxes and fees, and sell government-owned properties. Most notably, the measures propose not filling 5,800 vacant government jobs and consolidating various agencies to eliminate another 9,000 to 12,000 public sector positions. The plan also calls for increasing business, income, and consumption taxes sharply. The sale of property--primarily land in the reverted areas of the Canal Zone--or an unknown amount of other assets such as gold reserves could net the regime millions of dollars in income. [redacted]

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
Aid from Foreign Governments

[redacted] the regime has intensified its efforts to secure funding from foreign governments. Although Panama City's requests to Japan and West European governments have gone unheeded, the regime might obtain aid--although the sum probably would not exceed \$50 million--from one or more non-Western sources:

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
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- The regime has been slowly expanding low-level commercial relations with the Soviet Union since last year and may be willing to strengthen economic and political ties if Moscow agrees to provide some financial support in the near term.
- We believe the regime also might persuade other Latin governments to provide bridge loans or make deposits in Panamanian banks, particularly if the regime succeeds in portraying itself as a victim of US aggression.



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
In our judgment, however, little assistance is likely to be offered in the midst of Panama's immediate political and economic crisis. Foreign governments are unlikely to commit funds until they believe the regime's political position is secure and economic activity is returning to normal. In addition, many Latin governments probably would feel constrained from providing significant help because of their own economic difficulties.



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Drug Money Laundering Proceeds


Latin American drug traffickers, in our view, control sufficient liquid assets to alleviate--or even end--the regime's current cash flow problem, if they so desired.*



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Nonetheless, Panama's attractiveness as a place to launder drug money has been due principally to the banking center's convenience, stability, and a lack of international scrutiny--factors which no longer apply. Moreover, although the exact

* In our judgment, the economic power of top narcotics traffickers was best illustrated in mid-1984 when, during meetings with Colombia's Attorney General and a former Colombian president, they offered to give Bogota \$3 billion to retire its foreign debt in exchange for a guarantee not to extradite them to the United States, according to US Embassy reporting.



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dimensions of Noriega's personal relationship with narcotics traffickers remains unclear, we doubt that traffickers regard him, or even Panama, as essential to their activities. [redacted]

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Assistance from Private, Non-Commercial Investors

[redacted] the regime-- [redacted]
[redacted] has actively sought financing from private, non-commercial sources. [redacted]

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[redacted] in late February, a source of the US Embassy reported on a regime plan to secure financial assistance from private individuals in Western Europe. Although the ability of private individuals or syndicates to provide a sufficient rescue package probably is limited, some adventurous private investors might be willing to lend Noriega \$10-15 million at usurious terms even in the midst of the current crisis. While Panama City is reportedly studying the possibility of selling bonds, we believe that such a bond placement would be ill-conceived in the current circumstances. [redacted]

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Resort to Radical Actions

If financial pressures on Panama mount, we believe the regime would consider radical measures to maintain its control. Panama City might move to nationalize the banking system or freeze assets of banks and other corporations in Panama. The regime probably realizes, however, that the large deposits once kept in Panama probably have been physically or electronically transferred out of the country, limiting the actual financial gain from such a move. According to Embassy estimates, US fixed investments in Panama total some \$1.5 billion. Of this amount, \$750 million is invested in oil refining and pipeline operations, \$300 million in agricultural and fishing, and another \$200 million in the banking sector. [redacted]

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[redacted]
government officials also have discussed ending Panama's use of the US dollar as its currency as a measure of last resort. Such a move might alleviate the immediate financial crisis, but would create chaos in the domestic economy in the short- to medium-term. [redacted]

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Other Intangibles

Several other factors could play a major role in the regime's ability to survive financially. The Defense Forces, for example, might choose to use some or all of the non-budgetary income it derives from extensive business and other enterprises to reduce the budget deficit, if it is not doing so already. Similarly, Noriega and other wealthy senior military officers might choose to plug critical government funding gaps by drawing on some of their financial holdings that are rumored to total in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Although we have no basis

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upon which to estimate the amount of personal funds that Noriega might expend, his determination to resist US pressure might make even large personal financial sacrifices worthwhile. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

In our judgment, the next few weeks will be the most critical for Panama City as it attempts to restore order in the banking system and meet its essential expenses. Noriega's most pressing problem is to end the immediate banking and commercial crisis that has developed as a result of panic-driven capital flight and the currency shortages caused by the legal action filed by deposed President Delvalle. If he resolves the immediate financial crisis, his chances of developing additional sources of revenue and coping with the political tensions that would accompany harsh austerity measures would be significantly improved. [REDACTED]

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On the other hand, if continuing financial crisis sparks panic withdrawals or keeps many banks from opening, business and commercial activities would be severely restricted and government revenues could fall by as much as half. The regime probably would react to such a drop in revenues by sharply reducing public works programs, delaying disbursements for government purchases, and postponing payments for critical imports such as oil. An indefinite currency shortage would almost certainly prompt widespread popular discontent forcing the regime to take even harsher measures. [REDACTED]

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Without a shortrun turnaround in the banking situation, it is unlikely that the government will be able to weather the immediate crisis without crippling Panama's economy. The events of the last two weeks largely have torpedoed any remaining chance that Panama can survive as a major international financial center. In our judgment, most of the potential alternative sources of financing that might benefit the regime--such as deposits from drug money launderers or loans from private non-official lenders--would probably dry up. [REDACTED]

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We believe Noriega would not hesitate to endorse radical economic measures before relinquishing power if he viewed his regime's financial situation as insolvable. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Apart from policy moves such as the establishment of a new currency, Noriega eventually might choose to seize the physical assets of extensive US business interests in Panama or nationalize US companies, both to improve the regime's balance sheet and to retaliate against real or perceived official US actions. [REDACTED]

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TABLE 1: PANAMA: SHORT-TERM FINANCING REQUIREMENTS¹
(Million US \$)

MARCH

<u>Expenditures</u>		<u>Resources</u>	
Wages & salaries	35	Cash on hand	49-50
Goods & services	10	Income	75
Pensions & transfers	12	Taxes	54 ²
Public works, etc.	8	Non-tax receipts	21 ³
Priority amortization	8		
Total, excluding debt service	73	Total availability	115-125
Commercial bank interest	45 ⁴		
Total including debt service	118		

APRIL

<u>Expenditures</u>		<u>Resources</u>	
Wages & salaries	47	Income	81
Goods & services	10	Taxes	60
Pensions & transfers	12	Non-tax receipts	21
Public works, etc.	8		
Priority amortization	8		
Total, excluding debt service	85		
Commercial bank principal	70 ⁴		
Total including debt service	155		

TWO-MONTH TOTALS

Essentials expenditures	158	Current income	156
With all debt service	273	Income plus reserves	196-206

¹Projected, assuming the economic situation soon normalizes following the general strike.

²Assumes 10 percent reduction in tax receipts this month because of general strike disturbances.

³Assumes Panama Canal Commission withholds its \$7 million monthly fee remittance to the regime.

⁴These debt services are unlikely; Bank Advisory Committee does not expect Panama to meet March interest obligations. The Committee will convene in early March to consider regime's request to continue rolling over amortization as they have since existing rescheduling agreement signed 31 October 1985.

TABLE 2: PANAMA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 1985-1988
(Million US \$)

	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u> ¹	<u>1988</u> ²	<u>1988</u> ³	<u>1988</u> ⁴
Financing Requirements	1,373	1,438	1,765	1,850	1,670	1,670
Current Expenditures	956	993	1,055	1,100	980	980
Wages & Salaries	422	430	450	440	400	400
Goods & Services	110	105	145	120	100	100
Pensions & Transfer	121	137	140	141	110	110
Interest	303	321	320	399	370	370
Capital Expenditures	417	445	710	750	690	690
Public works, etc.	117	105	110	100	40	40
Amortization due	300	380	600	650	650	650
Current Revenues	984	1,034	1,020	1,050	1,100	900
Tax	689	754	730	720	760	700
Other	295	280	290	330	340	200
Financial Deficit	389	444	745	800	570	770
Debt Relief	190	240	520	550	550	550
Refinancing	190	240	--	--	550	550
Arrears	--	--	520	550	--	--
Gap After Debt Relief	199	204	225	250	20	220
External Financing	105	142	35	15	20	--
Commercial	30	10	10	--	--	--
Official	75	132	25	15	20	--
Internal Financing	94	62	190	235	--	220
Memorandum Items:						
Scheduled Debt Service	603	701	920	1,049	1,020	1,020
Paid	413	461	400	499	470	470

¹Estimated.

²Projected, assuming current budget proposals, end of general strike, and no additional international financial sanctions.

³Projected, based on additional austerity measures.

⁴Projected, assuming fuller international sanctions and tough Panamanian austerity measures.

SUBJECT: PANAMA: COPING WITH THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 7 Mar 88

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- 1 - The Honorable John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State
- 2 - The Honorable Donald Gregg, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Rm. 298, OEOB
- 3 - The Honorable John D. Negroponte, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House
- 4 - Mr. Stephen I. Danzansky, Special Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, NSC, Rm. 365, OEOB
- 5 - Ambassador Jose Sorzano, NSC, Room 391, OEOB
- 6 - Mr. Kim Flowers, NSC, Room 391, OEOB
- 7 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- 8 - The Honorable Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Room 6263, State
- 9 - The Honorable William G. Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central America, Room 4915, State
- 10- Mr. Richard Wyrrough, Director of Panamanian Affairs, Room 4915, State
- 11- Mr. Vince Mayer, Panama Desk Officer, Rm. 4915, State
- 12- Mr. Luigi Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning and Coordination/ARA Room 6913A, State
- 13- Amb. Morton I. Abramowitz, Asst. Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Room 6531, State
- 14- Mr. Robert Fouche, Director, Office of Analysis for Inter-American Republics/INR, Room 7358, State
- 15- Mr. James Buchanan, Chief South America Division/INR/IAA/SA, Room 7534, State
- 16- Mr. Charles Siegman, Federal Reserve Board, Rm. B1228
- 17- The Honorable Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, DOD, Room 4E808, Pentagon
- 18- Mr. Robert Pastorino, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, DOD, Room 4C800, Pentagon
- 19- B. General Charles D. Link, JCS/JS, Pentagon, Room 2E980
- 20- LTG Dale A. Vesser, JCS, Room 2E996, Pentagon
- 21- RADM Anthony A. Less, JCS, Room 2E976, Pentagon
- 22- LTG Leonard H. Perroots, USAF, D/DIA, Room 3E258, Pentagon
- 23- Col. John Cash, DIO/DIA, Room 2A520, Pentagon
- 24- SOUTHCOM, J2
- 25- SOUTHCOM, J5
- 26- LTG William E. Odom, USA, D/NSA, Room 3A156, Fort Meade
- 27- Mr. Randall Fort, Department of the Treasury, Rm. 4324
- 28- Mr. David Mulford, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, Room 3432, Treasury
- 29- DDCI

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- 30-31 - DCI/DDCI Executive Staff, Room 7E12 (2)
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- 33- O/DDI, [REDACTED] Room 7E44
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- 35- NIO/Economics, Rm. 7E62
- 36- NIC/AG, Room 7E47
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